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psychic aspect of behavior altogether is usually betrayed into drawing inferences regarding it of a distinctly unguarded character.

The discussion of human memory, finally, contains chapters on the modalities of memory, where the identity of the laws governing human and animal memory is maintained, for instance the law that forgetting is at first rapid and later much slower, and the law that a given number of repetitions is more effective if distributed over a considerable interval than if massed; on the variations of memory, ethnic, individual, ontogenetic, and pathological; and on the utilization of memory, in connection with which the author maintains that intellectual progress consists in a gradual freeing of intelligence from subjection to memory, by various devices, such as scientific laws and mathematical formulæ, which enable experience of the past to be conveniently synthesized.

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An Outline of Logic. By B. H. BODE. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1910.—pp. 324.

"The aim of this volume is, among other things, to give a concrete discussion of ambiguity, to simplify the study of causal connections, and to treat with greater detail than is usually done the type of inference called circumstantial evidence, the nature of proof, and the postulates of reasoning. The place assigned to the syllogism is relatively small, the subject being presented with a minimum of detail. In the distribution of emphasis, the function of logic as a guide in reasoning has been constantly borne in mind. It is partly for this reason that the illustrations are, as a rule, taken from other sources than the physical sciences because I incline to think that in the past these latter have been relied upon more than is desirable. Finally I have added a chapter on sense perception, in the hope that it will aid in making logic a propædæutic to philosophy" (p. v).

After the introductory chapter we find chapters on "Classification and Class Names," "Ambiguity and Definition," "Some Special Forms of Ambiguity," "The Nature and Interpretation of Propositions," "The Categorical Syllogism," "Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms," "False Assumption or Begging of the Question," "The Proof of Universal Connections," "The Proof of Causal Connections," "Probability," "Circumstantial Evidence and the Test of Truth," "Observation and Memory," "The Nature of Reasoning," "The Authority and Test of Truth," and "The Problem of Sense Perception."

The discussion first points out that the consciousness of likeness and of difference are the central thought functions in reasoning. Where likeness predominates, classification and class names result. But these change in meaning and are often vague, and ambiguity, one of the two most prevalent errors in reasoning, is the consequence. "An ambiguous argument correctly assumes some resemblance among the members of the class, but it mistakes the nature of the resemblance, and this is the reason why a statement which is

supposed to be true of all is true only of some" (p. 27). The test whereby ambiguity is exposed, "is to substitute other terms for those to which a suspicion of ambiguity attaches itself" (p. 27).

The question is then raised as to "what the relation of classes must be to each other in order to make correct inferences possible." This leads to the statement that "a judgment is a mental assertion of something as true or untrue, while a proposition is the expression of the judgment in words" (p. 52). But a proposition is only one of the ways in which a judgment may be expressed and so there is a discussion of various transformations of propositions which are free from ambiguity. Here, for the purposes of underclass teaching, one might perhaps prefer a fuller exposition.

The treatment of the categorical syllogism, like those by Jevons and Creighton—except for the omission of their second rule—gives seven rules of the syllogism and illustrates with circles. The errors of denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent are reduced to cases of false obversion. After the formal fallacies follows the discussion of what are usually called the material fallacies. These are ambiguity and false assumption. In fact, "it will appear that the fallacies of ambiguity and imperfect disjunction may also, if we see fit, be viewed as cases of false assumption" (p. 95). "False assumption consists in making an assumption which an opponent would not grant if its real character were understood" (p. 95). Here, it will be observed, the author has practically followed Creighton in naming the two classes of fallacies, only that Creighton uses the conventional names in pointing out the fallacies included under these heads, whereas the author, *e. g.*, gives only two special forms of false assumption: reasoning in a circle and irrelevancy or ignoring the question. The latter has a subordinate form, the *Argumentum ad Hominem* or the *Argumentum ad Populum* (p. 105). There is no doubt that some simplification of the sub-classes of fallacies would be very desirable, but the question arises whether this particular simplification compensates for the loss of the definiteness which the pupil finds in Creighton's presentation.

In the chapters concerned with the inductive side of logic, a distinction is made between the proof of universal connections and the proof of causal connections. If "we wish to prove a universal connection, we must select our cases so as to vary the circumstances as much as possible. The process is a process of elimination. We rid ourselves of those circumstances in which our cases differ, in order to isolate the circumstances in which they all agree. If we find that all circumstances can be varied except one, we are entitled to conclude that this circumstance in which all the cases agree is an unfailing sign of the attribute in question; and the method by which this conclusion is established may, therefore, be called the Method of Agreement" (p. 110). This method, however, cannot prove a causal connection, for causation is not a matter of universal propositions, but of the elements involved in universal connections. We can say that, other things being equal, certain constituents produce the effects; in other words, we can get general propositions but not universals. Furthermore, universal propositions, as just quoted, result from

the emphasis of resemblances, whereas the reverse procedure obtains in proving causal relations. "We can discover causes only by noticing the difference between those cases in which the cause is present and those in which it is not" (p. 125). Consequently the Method of Difference is the characteristic method here, the Joint Method and Concomitant Variations being merely variations of Difference.

The test of analogical inference is motivated doubt which is defined as "a doubt that can point to some fact which seems to establish an analogy or a general rule as a basis for the doubt" (p. 166). If different analogies are combined to support a conclusion, we have circumstantial evidence. The test of this form of reasoning is again motivated doubt, also the harmony of the present experience with the large body of previous experience.

A chapter on the Nature of Reasoning is followed by two chapters on the Authority of the Test of Truth and the Problem of Sense Perception which give the student an excellent introduction to further problems of philosophy and which, together with a good collection of exercises, bring the book to a close.

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Die menschliche Geistestätigkeit in der Weltentwicklung. Eine kritisch-philosophische Betrachtung des menschlichen Geistes, mit Anwendung der Prinzipien auf die Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Von AUGUST J. GISS. Band I. Leipzig, A. Deichert, 1910.—pp. xvii, 278.

This work, as the author tells us in the preface, "resulted from the attempt to comprehend the content of the Kantian doctrine, particularly the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this connection I have proceeded upon the following assumption: There are in the world's history world-ordering, spiritual activities (*weltordnende geistige Tätigkeiten*), which have exerted a determining influence upon the development of the world. The Kantian *Critique* constitutes such a world-ordering, spiritual activity. It has exerted a determining influence upon the spiritual development of the world. But it also constitutes a human, spiritual activity. How is it possible that a human, spiritual activity should constitute a world-ordering, spiritual activity? This is the fundamental problem. From the standpoint of this assumption, I could consider the problem solved only when I succeeded in understanding the Kantian *Critique* as the product of a human, spiritual activity."

The meaning of this rather enigmatical *Problemstellung* appears gradually as the work proceeds. The author states that his attempts to attain an intimate appreciation of the fundamental problems of Kant's critical labors were unsuccessful at the outset, that Kant's achievements constantly appeared to him as something superhuman, something beyond purely human possibility. That Kant's work was the product of human endeavor did not become fully intelligible, until it was interpreted in the light of the hypothesis that it really embodies two distinct systems of thought.

These two systems of thought are the critical and the idealistic. With